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Abstract
Distributed machine learning (ML) systems today use an un-
sophisticated threat model: data sources must trust a central
ML process. We propose a brokered learning abstraction that
allows data sources to contribute towards a globally-shared
model with provable privacy guarantees in an untrusted set-
ting. We realize this abstraction by building on federated
learning, the state of the art in multi-party ML, to construct
TorMentor: an anonymous hidden service that supports pri-
vate multi-party ML.
We define a new threat model by characterizing, develop-
ing and evaluating new attacks in the brokered learning set-
ting, along with new defenses for these attacks. We show that
TorMentor effectively protects data providers against known
ML attacks while providing them with a tunable trade-off
between model accuracy and privacy. We evaluate TorMen-
tor with local and geo-distributed deployments on Azure/Tor.
In an experiment with 200 clients and 14 MB of data per
client, our prototype trained a logistic regression model us-
ing stochastic gradient descent in 65s.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) models rely on large volumes of di-
verse, representative data for training and validation. How-
ever, to build multi-party models from user-generated data,
users must provide and share their potentially sensitive infor-
mation. Existing solutions [30, 28], even when incorporating
privacy-preserving mechanisms [1], assume the presence of
a trusted central entity that all users share their data and/or
model updates with. For example, the Gboard service [32]
uses sensitive data from Android keyboard inputs to generate
better text suggestions; users who wish to train an accurate
Gboard suggestion model must send their mobile keyboard
data to Google.
Federated learning [31] keeps data on the client device and
trains ML models by only transferring model parameters to
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a trusted central coordinator. In the quest for training the
optimal ML model as quickly as possible, the coordinator is
not incentivized to provide privacy for data providers: data
is collected and is only kept on the device as a performance
optimization [31].
Furthermore, federated learning is not private or secure
against adversaries, who can pose as honest data providers
or an honest coordinator and who use auxiliary informa-
tion from the learning process to infer information about the
training data of other users [21], despite data never being ex-
plicitly shared. One may consider obfuscating data labels
before learning, but this is also insufficient to guarantee pri-
vacy [8]. General privacy-preserving computation models
exist, but they rely on substantial amounts of additional in-
frastructure. These include homomorphically encrypted se-
cure aggregation [6], secure multi-party computation [33],
or trusted SGX infrastructure [38], all of which are infeasi-
ble for individuals and small organizations to deploy.
Today there is no accessible solution to collaborative
multi-party machine learning that maintains privacy and
anonymity in an untrusted setting. In developing this solu-
tion, we propose a novel setting called brokered learning that
decouples the role of coordination from the role of defining
the learning process. We introduce a short-lived, honest-but-
curious broker that mediates interactions between a curator,
who defines the shared learning task, and clients, who pro-
vide training data. In decoupling these roles, curators are no
longer able to directly link clients to their model updates, and
cannot manipulate the learning process.
Clients and curators never directly communicate: they are
protected from each other by a broker that is only used to
coordinate the learning task. The broker is administered by
an honest-but-curious neutral party, meaning that it does not
initiate actions and follows the prescribed learning process.
The broker detects and rejects anomalous behavior and ter-
minates when the learning process as instructed, but is curi-
ous and will examine client data if able. Our system design
supports privacy and anonymity by building on accessible
public infrastructure to minimize the cost of setting up and
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maintaining a broker.
We realize the brokered learning setting by designing, im-
plementing, and evaluating TorMentor, a system which cre-
ates brokers to interface with the curator and the clients in a
brokered learning process. TorMentor is implemented as a
hidden Tor service, but can use any general-purpose anony-
mous communication service to safeguard the identities of
curators and clients.
Although the model curator is removed from the learn-
ing process, a myriad of other attacks are still possible. We
adapt known ML attacks to brokered learning and build on
several state of the art techniques to thwart a variety of these
attacks when they are mounted by clients, brokers and cura-
tors. Client-side differential privacy [12, 19] protects users
from inversion attacks [17, 16], reject on negative influ-
ence (RONI) [3] and monitored client statistics [34] prevent
model poisoning attacks [5, 24] and proof of work [2] miti-
gates sybil attacks [11].
Our evaluation of TorMentor demonstrates that these de-
fenses protect clients and curators from each other. For
example, in one experiment with 50% malicious poisoning
clients, a TorMentor broker was able to converge to an opti-
mum after mitigating and recovering from malicious behav-
ior through our novel adaptive proof of work mechanism. We
also evaluated the performance of our prototype in a geo-
distributed setting: across 200 geo-distributed clients with
14 MB of data per client, the training process in TorMentor
takes 67s. By comparison the training on a similar federated
learning system without Tor would take 13s. The observed
overhead of TorMentor ranges from 5-10x, and depending on
the level of privacy and security required, TorMentor’s mod-
ular design allows users to further tune the system to meet
their expected needs on the security-performance trade-off.
In summary, we make four contributions:
? We develop a brokered learning setting for privacy-
preserving anonymous multi-party machine learning in
an untrusted setting. We define the responsibilities, in-
teractions, and threat models for the three actors in bro-
kered learning: curators, clients, and the broker.
? We realize the brokered learning model in the design
and implementation of TorMentor and evaluate Tor-
Mentor’s training and classification performance on a
public dataset.
? We translate known attacks on centralized ML (poison-
ing [24, 37] and inversion [17, 16]) and known defenses
in centralized ML (RONI [3], differential privacy [12])
to the brokered learning setting. We evaluate the pri-
vacy and utility implications of these attacks and de-
fenses.
? We design, implement, and evaluate three new defense
mechanisms for the brokered learning setting: dis-
tributed RONI, adaptive proof of work, and threshold-
ing the number of clients.
2 Background
Machine Learning (ML). Many ML problems can be rep-
resented as the minimization of a loss function in a large Eu-
clidean space. For example, a binary classification task in
ML involves using features from data examples to predict
discrete binary outputs; a higher loss results in more pre-
diction errors. Given a set of training data and a proposed
model, ML algorithms train, or iteratively find an optimal
set of parameters, for the given training set. One approach is
to use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [7], an iterative al-
gorithm which samples a batch of training examples of size
b, uses them to compute gradients on the parameters of the
current model, and takes gradient steps in the corresponding
gradient direction. The algorithm then updates the model
parameters and another iteration is performed (Appendix A
contains all background formalisms).
Our work uses SGD as the training method. SGD is a
general learning algorithm that is used to train a variety of
models, including deep learning [44].
Distributed multi-party ML. To support larger models and
datasets, ML training has been parallelized using a param-
eter server architecture [28]: the global model parameters
are partitioned and stored on multiple parameter server ma-
chines. At each iteration, client machines pull the parameters
from server machines, compute and apply one or more itera-
tions, and push their updates back to the server. This can be
done with a synchronous or asynchronous protocol [23, 40],
both of which are supported in our work.
Federated Learning [31]. The partitioning of training data
enables multi-party machine learning: data is distributed
across multiple data owners and cannot be shared. Federated
learning supports this setting through a protocol in which
clients send gradient updates in a distributed SGD algo-
rithm. These updates are collected and averaged by a central
server, enabling training over partitioned data sources from
different owners.
Attacks on ML. Our work operates under a unique and
novel set of assumptions when performing ML and requires
a new threat model. Despite this novel setting, the attacks are
functionally analogous to state of the art ML attacks known
today.
Poisoning attack. In a poisoning attack [5, 34], an adver-
sary meticulously creates adversarial training examples and
inserts them into the training data set of a target model. This
may be done to degrade the accuracy of the final model (a
random attack), or to increase/decrease the probability of a
targeted example being predicted as a target class (a targeted
attack) [24]. For example, such an attack could be mounted
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to avoid anomaly detectors [41] or to evade email spam fil-
tering [37].
In federated learning, clients possess a disjoint set of the
total training data; they have full control over this set, and
can therefore perform poisoning attacks with minimal diffi-
culty.
Information leakage. In an information leakage attack,
such as model inversion, an adversary attempts to recover
training examples from a trained model f (x). Given a tar-
geted class y, one inversion technique involves testing all
possible values in a feasible feature region, given that some
information about the targeted example is known. The attack
then finds the most probable values of the targeted example
features [17].
Another model inversion attack uses prediction confidence
scores from f (x) when predicting y to perform gradient de-
scent to train a model ˆf (x) that closely resembles f (x). The
victim’s features are probabilistically determined by using
the model in prediction. The resulting vector x that comes
from this process is one that most closely resembles an orig-
inal victim training example [16].
Information leakage attacks have been extended to feder-
ated learning: instead of querying information from a fully
trained model, an adversary observes changes in the shared
model during the training process itself [21]. In doing so,
the adversary can reconstruct training examples that belong
to other clients.
Defenses for ML. A RONI (Reject on Negative Influence) de-
fense [3] counters ML poisoning attacks. Given a set of un-
trusted training examples Dun, this defense trains two mod-
els, one model using all of the trusted training data D, and
another model using the union dataset D′ = D∪Dun which
includes the untrusted data. If the performance of D′ is sig-
nificantly worse than the performance of D on a validation
dataset, the data Dun is flagged as malicious and rejected.
However, this defense relies on access to the centralized
dataset, which is infeasible in the federated learning setting.
Differential privacy [12] is a privacy guarantee that en-
sures that, for a given dataset, when used to answer ques-
tions about a given population, that no adversary can identify
individuals that are members of the dataset. Differential pri-
vacy is user-centric: the violation of a single user’s privacy is
considered a privacy breach. Differential privacy is parame-
terized by ε , which controls the privacy-utility trade-off. In
the ML context, utility equates to model performance [44].
When ε approaches 0, full privacy is ensured, but an inac-
curate model is produced. When ε approaches infinity, the
optimal model is produced without any privacy guarantees.
Differential privacy has been applied to several classes of
ML algorithms [42, 4] in decentralized settings to theoret-
ically guarantee that a client’s privacy is not compromised
when their data is used to train a model. This guarantee ex-
tends to both the training of the model and to usage of the
Curator 2 …Curator 1 Curator N
Client pool 1 Client pool 2 Client pool N
… … ……
Broker 1 Broker 2 Broker 3…
Figure 1: Brokered learning and TorMentor design. Brokers
(implemented as hidden Tor services) mediate between cu-
rators (top) and sets of clients (bottom).
model for predictions.
Differentially private SGD [44, 19] is a method that
applies differential privacy in performing SGD. Before
sending gradient updates at each iteration, clients perturb
their gradient values with additive noise, which protects
the privacy of the input dataset. The choice of batch size
impacts the effect of the privacy parameter on the model
performance. Our work uses differentially private SGD to
provide the flexible privacy levels against attacks in our
setting.
Anonymous communication systems. Clients are still at
privacy risk when sending model updates directly to an un-
trusted broker, so we add an additional layer of indirec-
tion in our work. Onion routing protocols are a modern
method for providing anonymity in a distributed P2P setting.
When communicating with a target node, clients route traffic
through a randomly selected set of relay nodes in the net-
work, which obfuscates the source and destination nodes for
each message.
Our work supports the use of any modern implementation
for providing anonymous communication. We select the Tor
network [10] as the system in our implementation.
Sybil attacks and proof of work. An anonymous sys-
tem that allows users to join and leave may be attacked by
sybils [11], in which an adversary joins a system under mul-
tiple colluding aliases. One approach to mitigate sybil at-
tacks is to use proof of work [2], in which a user must solve
a computationally expensive problem (that is easy to verify)
to contribute to the system. This mechanism provides the
guarantee that if at least 50% of the total computation power
in the system is controlled by honest nodes, the system is
resilient to sybils.
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3 Brokered Learning
In this work, we define brokered learning, which builds on
the federated learning setting [31], but assumes no trust be-
tween clients and curators.
3.1 Decoupling federated learning
In federated learning, a central organization (such as Google)
acts as the parameter server and performs two logically sep-
arate tasks: (1) define the data schema and the learning ob-
jective, (2) coordinate distributed ML. The federated learn-
ing server performs both tasks at a central service, however,
there are good reasons to separate them.
Fundamentally, the goals of data privacy and model accu-
racy are at tension. Coordinating the ML training process in
a private and secure manner compromises the model’s abil-
ity to learn as much as possible from the training data. In
current learning settings, the coordinator is put in a position
to provide privacy, yet they are not incentivized to do so.
To take things even further, a malicious curator can ob-
serve the contributions of any individual client, creating an
opportunity to perform information leakage [21] attacks on
clients, such as model inversion [17, 16] or membership in-
ference [43]. These attacks can be mitigated in federated
learning with a secure aggregation protocol [6], but this so-
lution does not handle poisoning attacks and requires several
coordinated communication rounds between clients for each
iteration.
Client anonymity may also be desirable when privacy
preferences are shared. For example, if attempting to train
a model that uses past criminal activity as a feature, one
user with strong privacy preferences in a large group of users
with weak privacy preferences will appear suspicious, even
if their data is not revealed.
A key observation in our work is that because data
providers and model curators agree on a learning objective
before performing federated learning, there is no need for
the curator to also coordinate the learning.
Brokered learning decouples the two tasks into two dis-
tinct roles and includes mechanisms for anonymity to protect
data providers from the curator while orchestrating federated
learning. In this setting the users in the system (model cura-
tors and data providers) do not communicate with one an-
other, which facilitates a minimal trust model, strengthening
user-level privacy and anonymity. As well, users do not re-
veal their personal privacy parameters to the broker, since all
privacy-preserving computation is performed on the client.
At the same time brokered learning maintains the existing
privacy features of federated learning: data providers do not
need to coordinate with each other (or even be aware of each
other). This is important to counter malicious clients who
attack other clients [21].
3.2 Defining brokered learning
Brokered learning builds on federated learning [31] but pro-
vides additional privacy guarantees. This model introduces a
broker to mediate the learning process.
Curators define the machine learning model. A curator
has a learning task in mind, but lacks the sufficient volume
or variety of data to train a quality model. Curators would
like to collaborate with clients to perform the learning task
and may want to remain anonymous. We provide curators
with anonymity in TorMentor by deploying a broker as a Tor
hidden service, and by using the broker as a point of indirec-
tion (Figure 1).
Curators may know the identities of clients that wish to
contribute to the model or may be unaware of the clients that
match their learning objectives. Brokered learning supports
these and other use cases, For example, curators may know
some subset of the clients, or set a restriction on the maxi-
mum number of anonymous clients who can contribute1.
Clients contribute their data to the machine learning task
and specify the criteria for their participation. Instead of
fully trusting the curator as they would in federated learn-
ing, clients communicate with an honest-but-curious broker.
The broker is trusted with coordinating the learning process
and does not initiate actions. However, the broker is curi-
ous and will examine client data and indentities if possible.
This threat model is similar to what was used in the secure
aggregation protocol for federated learning [6].
Brokered learning allows these clients to jointly contribute
to a shared global model, without being aware of nor trusting
each other. Each client only needs to be concerned about its
personal privacy parameters. Some clients may be more con-
cerned with privacy than others; brokered learning supports
differentially private machine learning with heterogeneous
privacy levels, which has been shown to be feasible [19].
A broker is a short-lived process that coordinates the
training of a multi-party ML model. For each model de-
fined by a curator in TorMentor, a single broker is created
and deployed as a hidden service in an anonymous network
2. Clients perform actions such as requesting access to the
system, defining client-specific privacy parameters and send-
ing model updates for distributed SGD. We define a precise
client API in Section 5. When model training is complete,
the broker publishes the model and terminates. In our vision,
brokers are not intended to be long lasting, and their sole
function should be to broker the agreement between users to
facilitate anonymous multi-party ML. Brokers may even ex-
plicity be managed by governments or as part of a privacy
enhancing business model, both of whom are incentivized to
provide privacy, anonymity and fairness in distributed ML.
1We assume that the broker identifies or advertises the learning process
to clients out of band, externally to TorMentor.
2In this paper we do not consider who is running the broker; but we do
assume that it is an honest-but-curious third party that is distinct from the
curator and the participating clients.
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Figure 2: (a) Attacks/defenses in TorMentor. (b) Threat
model: an edge is an attack by source against target(s).
3.3 Example use cases
Medical Sharing Network. Hospitals store substantial
patient medical data. However, due to strict regulations, they
cannot share this data with each other. No individual hospi-
tal wishes to host the infrastructure for model coordination,
and no individual hospital is trusted to securely coordinate
the analysis. An alternative solution is for the network of
hospitals to collaborate in a brokered learning system. For
this the hospitals would define the learning task, one hospital
would agree to deploy the broker as a hidden service, and
all other willing hospitals would join and contribute model
updates, training a shared model.
Internet of Things. With the growth of the Internet
of Things (IoT), and a largely heterogeneous set of de-
vice providers, there is currently no solution for privacy-
preserving multi-device ML, hosted by a neutral provider.
Without anonymous multi-party ML, each system device
provider would need to host their own ML coordinators and
would have no mechanism for sharing models across other
providers.
Brokered learning allows these devices to collaborate on
model training without explicitly trusting each other. De-
vices reap the benefits of shared trained models, without risk-
ing data privacy loss. The broker can be run by any single
company, or a neutral trusted third party, neither of which
have power to compromise device-level privacy.
4 Threat model, guarantees, assumptions
We realized brokered learning in a system called TorMen-
tor, which uses differentially private distributed SGD [44] to
train a model in an anonymous multi-party setting. We select
Tor [10] as the anonymous communication network for Tor-
Mentor. TorMentor is designed to counter malicious curators
and malicious clients who may attempt to gain additional in-
formation (information leakage) about others or negatively
influence the learning process (poisoning). The honest-but-
curious broker coordinates the learning process, but is not
trusted with the identity nor the data of users.
Clients and curators do not attack the broker itself,
rather they aim to attack other curators, other clients, or the
outcome of the learning process. Brokers are also untrusted
in the system: the client and curator APIs protect them from
potential broker attacks. Figure 2 overviews TorMentor’s
threat model with attacks/defenses and who can attack who
and how.
Deanonymization. For anonymous communication to
and from the broker we assume a threat model similar
to Tor [10]: an adversary has the ability to observe and
control some, but not all of the network. Adversaries may
attempt to observe Tor traffic as a client or as a broker in
the network [35, 13, 27]. Adversaries can also influence
traffic within Tor through their own onion router nodes,
which do not necessarily need to be active TorMentor clients.
Poisoning attacks. In our threat model, poisoning attacks
are performed by clients against shared models. After a
curator defines a model, adversarial clients can use the
defined learning objective to craft adversarial samples that
oppose the objective. We assume that adversaries generate
these adversarial samples using a common strategy such as
label flipping [5], and join the training process and poison
the model by influencing its prediction probabilities.
Inversion attacks. We assume that adversaries can target
a specific client victim who they know is using the system.
Inversion attacks can be executed from a variety of points:
the adversary may be administering the broker, the adver-
sary may curate a model that the victim joins, or the adver-
sary joins model training as a client, knowing that the victim
has also joined. Although the broker does not expose model
confidence scores in the model prediction API, which are a
key piece of information for performing inversion attacks in
a black-box setting [16], our threat model grants adversaries
white-box access to the model internals, which is more pow-
erful than a traditional model inversion attack.
In TorMentor, adversarial clients have access to the
global model and can infer confidence scores or gradient
step values by carefully observing changes to the global
model and reconstructing a copy of the victim’s local model.
This attack is similar to a model stealing attack [47]: after
stealing an accurate approximation of a victim’s local
model, an adversary can mount an inversion attack on the
approximation to reconstruct the victim’s training examples.
Sybil attacks. Since clients and curators join the system
anonymously, they can generate sybils, or multiple colluding
virtual clients, to attacks the system [11]. In federated learn-
ing, all users are given an equal stake in the system, and thus
sybils make poisoning and inversion attacks linearly easier
to perform.
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4.1 Security guarantees
TorMentor guarantees that curator and client identities re-
main anonymous to all parties in the system by using an
anonymous communication network. Our prototype uses Tor
and provides the same guarantees as Tor, however, it can
use other anonymous messaging systems [48, 9]. For exam-
ple, since Tor is susceptible to timing attacks, an adversary
could target a client by observing its network traffic to de-
anonymize its participation in the system.
TorMentor exposes a small, restrictive API to limit a user’s
influence on the system. TorMentor alleviates the risk of poi-
soning attacks and inversion attacks by allowing clients to
specify k, the minimum number of clients required for train-
ing. When a client joins the system, they specify the num-
ber of other clients required in the system, which TorMentor
guarantees will be honored. Clients also locally use differen-
tial privacy to further protect their privacy. Both parameters
are defined by the client, guaranteeing that clients (and not
the curator) controls this accuracy-privacy tradeoff.
TorMentor prevents sybils through proof of work, simi-
lar to the Bitcoin protocol [36]. This mechanism makes it
expensive, though not impossible, to mount a sybil attack.
Proof of work is implemented at two points: proof of work
as a prerequisite for system admission, and proof of work as
a prerequisite for contributing to the model.
4.2 Assumptions
We assume that the only means to access information within
the system is through the APIs defined in Section 5. A Tor-
Mentor instance and its corresponding brokers are exposed
as a hidden service with a public .onion domain. We as-
sume that this .onion becomes a widely known and trusted
domain3.
We use proof of work to defend against sybils and there-
fore assume that the adversary does not have access to more
than half of the computational power relative to the total
computational power across all users in an instance of the
TorMentor training process [2].
We make the same assumptions as Tor [10]; for example,
we assume that an adversary does not control a large fraction
of nodes within the Tor network.
5 TorMentor Design
TorMentor design has three goals: (1) meet the defined
learning objective in a reasonable amount of time, (2)
provide both anonymity and data privacy guarantees to
clients and curators, and (3) flexibly support client-specific
privacy requirements.
3To build further trust the TorMentor service can use an authoritatively
signed certificate.
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Figure 3: Overview of the TorMentor protocol between cu-
rator/broker/client.
Design overview. The broker handles all communication be-
tween clients and the curator, and acts as the coordinator in
an untrusted collaborative learning setting. Each TorMentor
broker is deployed as a Tor hidden service with a unique and
known .onion domain. Several clients may join a model once
a curator defines it, with requirements for joining specified
by both the curator and the clients. Each broker and there-
fore each model is associated with a pool of clients among
whom the learning procedure takes place (see Figure 1).
Each broker runs a separate aggregator process and val-
idator process. The aggregator serves the same purpose as a
parameter server [28]: storing and distributing the parame-
ters of the global model. The validator is a novel addition in
our work that observes and validates the values of gradient
updates sent by clients to the aggregator.
Next, we review the TorMentor API in Table 1 and the
training process illustrated in Figure 3. We then detail how
TorMentor defends against adversarial clients and curators.
5.1 Curator API
The curator uses the curate call to bootstrap a new model by
defining a common learning objective: the model type, the
desired training data schema and a validation dataset. These
are critical to perform ML successfully (even in a local set-
ting). We therefore expect that a curator can provide these.
Once the learning objective is defined, a Tor .onion ad-
dress is established for the specified model, and the system
waits for clients to contact the hidden service with a message
to join. The validation dataset is used by the validator to re-
ject adversaries, and to ensure that the ML training is making
6
API call Description
address ← curate(mID, maxCli, minCli, valid-
Set)
Curate a new model. Curator provides modelID, client count range,
validation set. TorMentor returns a hidden service address for a newly
specified broker.
Padmit ← join(mID) Client joins a curated model. Client provides modelID; TorMentor re-
turns a SHA-256 admission hash puzzle Padmit .
conn, Mt ← solve(mID, Sadmit , minCli, schema) Client finds the solution Sadmit to Padmit and joins. Client provides mod-
elID, solution to puzzle, min number of clients and its dataset schema;
TorMentor returns a connection and global model state.
Mg,t+1, Pi,t+1 ← gradientUpdate(mId, Si,t , ∆i,t ) Client pushes a local model update to the global model state. Client i
provides modelID, solution to previous SHA-256 puzzle Si,t and gradi-
ent update ∆i,t at iteration t; TorMentor returns new global model state
Mg,t+1, and the next SHA-256 puzzle Pi,t+1.
Table 1: TorMentor API. The curate call (top row) is the only curator API call. The bottom three calls are for clients.
progress towards model convergence.
Too few clients may lead to a weak model with biased
data, while a large number of clients will increase commu-
nication overhead. The curator can use the API to adjust an
acceptable range for the number of clients contributing to the
model.
5.2 Client API
A client uses the join call to join a curated model 4 A client’s
data is validated against the objective when joining. Our
prototype only checks that the specified number of features
matches those of the client, but more advanced automatic
schema validation techniques [39] can be used.
The client uses the solve call to perform a proof-of-work
validation, similar to that of the blockchain protocol [36], in
which a cryptographic SHA-256 admission hash is inverted,
the solution is verified to contain a required number of trail-
ing ‘0’ digits, and a new puzzle is published. Once the proof-
of-work is completed, the client is accepted as a contributor
to the model. Once the desired number of clients have been
accepted to the model, collaborative model training is per-
formed through the TorMentor protocol: each client com-
putes their SGD update on the global model and pushes it to
the parameter server through the gradientUpdate call.
Clients compute gradient updates locally. Clients also
maintain a personal privacy level ε and a personal batch size
b to tune their differentially-private updates during model
training. With the privacy-utility tradeoff in mind, it is nat-
ural for clients and curators to have different preferences re-
garding client privacy. Some clients may value privacy more
than others and thus will tune their own privacy risk, while
curators want to maximize their model utility TorMentor is
the first system to support anonymous machine learning in a
4We assume that the client is able to learn the curator-provided modelID
out of band. This may be through a third-party system or directly through
another anonymous service.
setting with heterogeneous user-controlled privacy goals.
5.3 Training process
Training in TorMentor (Algorithm 1) is performed in a fash-
ion similar to that of the parameter server [28]: each client
pulls the global model, locally computes a gradient step, and
applies the update to the global model. TorMentor uses the
differentially private SGD [44] method, which allows clients
to select their own privacy parameter ε and batch size b.
We assume that clients understand how to properly define
these parameters and are aware of their implications on the
privacy-utility tradeoff and their privacy budgets [12].
Since clients may fail or be removed from the system by
the broker, bulk synchronous computation in TorMentor may
be infeasible. Instead, as an alternative to the synchronous
update model in federated learning [31], TorMentor also sup-
ports a total asynchronous model [23, 28], which enables
parallelization but allows clients to compute gradients on
stale versions of the global model, potentially compromising
model convergence. A lock-free approach to parallel SGD is
feasible if the the step size is tuned properly, and the corre-
sponding global loss function meets certain strong convexity
guarantees [40], which we assume is true when using the
total asynchronous model in our brokered learning setting.
This approach also negates the affect of stragglers in a high
latency environment (see Section 7).
Clients are free to leave the training process at any time.
TorMentor keeps a registry of the active clients, and checks
that the minimum number of clients condition is met at each
gradient update. In the case of clients leaving the system,
TorMentor uses timeouts to detect the clients who drop out of
the system. Such clients do not negatively impact the curator
or other clients. As long as the required minimum number
of clients k exists, the learning process will not halt and no
work will be wasted.
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Data: Training data x,y; batch size b; privacy parameter
ε
Result: Returns a single gradient update on the model
parameters
while IsTraining do
Pull gradients wt from TorMentor;
Subsample b points (xi,yi) ∈ Bt from training data;
Draw noise Zt from Laplacian distribution;
Compute gradient step through differentially private
SGD;
Push gradient to TorMentor
end
Algorithm 1: TorMentor differentially private SGD train-
ing algorithm.
Client
Victim
Time
Broker
Mt
 a,t
Mt+1
 v,t+1
Mt+2
Compute v,t+1
Client
Attacker
Figure 4: One iteration in an inversion attack in which an
attacker observes the difference between Mt and Mt+2, and
infers this difference to be ∆V,t+1. After many iterations, the
attacker can discover M∗V , the optimal model trained on the
victim’s data.
5.4 Defending against inversion attacks
Although a direct inversion attack in federated learning has
not been realized yet, we envision a novel potential attack
in this scenario. Figure 4 shows the proposed ideal situation
for an attacker performing an inversion attack: a two client
TorMentor system, one of whom is the adversary.
In this scenario the victim V and attacker A alternate in
sending gradient updates to the broker. Since the global
model parameters are sent to the adversary at each iteration,
it can ideally observe the difference in the global model be-
tween iterations. As the attacker knows their contribution to
the global model at the previous iteration, they are able to
exactly compute the victim’s update by calculating:
Mt+2 = Mt +∆v,t+1+∆a,t
∆v,t+1 = Mt+1−Mt −∆a,t
By saving and applying ∆v,t at each iteration to a hidden,
shadow model, the adversary can compute an approximation
to MV , the optimal model trained with only the victim’s data,
similar to a model stealing attack [47]. The adversary can
then perform a model inversion attack [17, 16] and recon-
struct the victim’s training data elements in XV . In the case
that the broker carries out the inversion attack, the attack is
even stronger: the broker can isolate all updates sent to it
through a single connection.
Differential privacy offers a natural defense against attacks
from a broker or another client by perturbing the victim’s up-
dates ∆V,t that are sent to the broker. An adversary will find
it difficult to recover MV and XV when the privacy parameter
ε is closer to 0. An adversary could choose to send any vec-
tor as their ∆a,t update, which allows them to curate specific
gradients that elicit revealing responses from the victim [21].
In the case of attacks from other clients, the effectiveness
of the differentially private SGD protocol is also contingent
on a setting in which multiple clients are simultaneously per-
forming updates. When an adversarial client receives a new
copy of the global model in TorMentor, it has no mecha-
nism to discover which clients contributed to the model since
the last update, making it difficult to derive knowledge about
specific clients in the system.
Thus, TorMentor exposes a privacy parameter k to clients,
which clients use to express the minimum number of clients
that must be in the system before training can begin. Our dif-
ferentially private SGD only begins when n clients, each with
a parameter k≤ n exist in the system. Effectively, this means
that for an adversarial client to perform the ideal model in-
version against a victim with parameter k the adversary needs
to create k−1 sybil clients.
5.5 Defending against poisoning attacks
In adding the validator process, we propose an active pa-
rameter server alternative to the assumed passive parameter
server in current attacks [21]. The parameter server validates
each client’s contribution to the model health and penalizes
updates from suspicious connections.
We develop a distributed RONI defense that uses sets of
gradient updates, instead of datasets, and independently eval-
uates the influence that each gradient update has on the per-
formance of a trusted global model. Validation (Algorithm 2)
executes within the parameter server in TorMentor and vali-
dates that iterations performed by clients have a positive im-
pact. Validation is parameterized by two variables: the vali-
dation rate at which validations are performed, and the RONI
threshold [3] required before a client is flagged.
To ensure that validations are performed in a fair man-
ner, we benchmark all clients against the same candidate
model. The validator intersperses validation iterations within
the gradient updates requests in distributed SGD. A valida-
tion round is triggered through a periodic Bernoulli test, with
the probability parameterized by a validation rate. During a
validation round, the current model state is snapshotted, and
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Data: Stream of gradient updates from each client i,
over t iterations ∆i,t
Result: Reject a client if their updates oppose the
defined learning objective
while IsTraining do
Draw Bernoulli value v;
if v > VALIDATION_RATE then
Set current model Mt to be snapshot model Ms;
Wait for client responses;
end
if Client c contacts TorMentor then
Send Ms instead of Mt ;
Save response ∆c,s
end
if All clients responded then
Find RONI rc:
rc = err(Ms,Xval)− err(Ms+∆c,s,Xval);
totalc = totalc+ rc;
if totalc > THRESHOLD then
penalize c;
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: RONI validation algorithm.
a copy of this model is sent to all active clients. The clients’
gradient responses are collected and the RONI value is cal-
culated and accumulated.
In addition to the proof of work required to join the sys-
tem, we implement an adaptive proof of work mechanism to
mitigate sybils in poisoning attacks. A SHA-256 proof of
work puzzle that must be solved on each iteration before an
update to the global model is accepted by the broker. When a
client’s RONI score exceeds a defined negative threshold, the
broker increases the required trailing number of 0’s by one,
increasing the difficulty of the puzzle for that client. The dif-
ficulty of this puzzle is client- and iteration-specific, making
it more expensive for malicious clients to poison the model
and decreasing their influence relative to honest clients.
When the rate of validation is increased, the broker discov-
ers poisoning clients more quickly, but with a performance
overhead. When the RONI threshold is increased, the broker
is more likely to detect adversaries, but the false positive rate
of flagging honest nodes increases as well.
An important design detail is that a validation request
looks just like a gradient update request. Therefore, adver-
saries cannot trick the validator by appearing benign dur-
ing validation rounds while poisoning the true model. If
the snapshot model Ms is taken close enough to the current
model state Mt , it becomes more difficult for adversaries to
distinguish whether the updates they are receiving are gen-
uine gradient requests or not.
5.6 Modular design
To summarize, TorMentor includes several mechanisms to
provide various levels of client and curator privacy and secu-
rity. These include:
? Using Tor to provide anonymous communication for all
users (clients and the curator).
? Using proof of work as a form of admission control.
? A validator process that uses RONI and adaptive proof
of work to mitigate poisoning attacks and sybils.
? Differentially private SGD and minimum client en-
forcement to provide client privacy and to defend
against inversion attacks.
Each of these components operates independently, and if
brokered learning is deployed in a setting where some of the
described attacks are out of scope, these components can be
independently disabled.
6 TorMentor Implementation
We implemented a TorMentor prototype in 600 LOC in
Python 2.7 and 1,500 LOC in Go 1.85. All the communi-
cation primitives are developed in Go, while the vector com-
putation and ML are in Python. We implement differentially-
private SGD [44] in Numpy 1.12. For our noise function, we
use a multivariate isotropic Laplace distribution. As a per-
formance operation, we draw random samples from this dis-
tribution prior to training by using emcee, an MIT licensed
Monte Carlo (MCMC) ensemble sampler [15].
In our evaluation we deploy the TorMentor curator and
clients on Azure by using bash scripts consisting of 371
LOC. These bootstrap VMs with a TorMentor installation,
launch clients, and orchestrate experiments.
7 Evaluation
We evaluated our TorMentor design by carrying out several
local and wide-area experiments with the TorMentor proto-
type. Specifically, we answer the following four research
questions:
1. What are the effects of the privacy parameter ε and
batch size b on model convergence? (Section 7.2)
2. What is TorMentor’s overhead as compared to the base-
line alternative? (Section 7.3)
3. How effective are the privacy parameters ε and mini-
mum number of clients k in defending against inversion
attacks? (Section 7.4)
5 https://github.com/DistributedML/TorML
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Figure 5: Effects of differential privacy and batch size on training loss over time. As ε and b decrease, model convergence is
slower and may not be guaranteed.
4. How effective is validation in defending against poison-
ing attacks, and what are the effects of its parameters?
(Section 7.5)
Next we describe the methodology behind our experi-
ments and then answer each of the questions above.
7.1 Methodology
Credit card dataset. In our experiments we envision mul-
tiple credit card companies collaborating to train a better
model that predicts defaults of credit card payments. How-
ever, the information in the dataset is private, both to the
credit card companies and to their customers. In this con-
text, any individual company can act as the curator, the bro-
ker is a commercial trusted service provider, and clients are
the credit card companies with private datasets.
To evaluate this use-case we used a credit card dataset [49]
from the UCI machine learning repository [29]. The dataset
has 30,000 examples and 24 features. The features represent
information about customers, including their age, gender and
education level, along with information about the customer’s
payments over the last 6 months. The dataset also contains
information about whether or not the given customer man-
aged to pay their next credit card bill, which is used as the
prediction for the model.
Prior to performing the training, we normalized, per-
muted, and partitioned the datasets into a 70% training and
30% testing shard. For each experiment, the training set is
further sub-sampled to create a client dataset, and the testing
shard is used as the curator-provided validation set. Training
error, the primary metric used in evaluation, is calculated as
the error when classifying the entire 70% training shard. In
brokered learning, no single client would have access to the
entire training dataset, so this serves as a hypothetical metric.
Wide-area deployment on Azure. We evaluated TorMentor
at scale by deploying a geo-distributed set of 25 Azure VMs,
each running in a separate data center, spanning 6 continents.
Each VM was deployed using Azure’s default Ubuntu 16.06
resource allocation. Each VM was provisioned with a sin-
gle core Intel Xeon E5-2673 v3 2.40GHz CPU, and 4 GB
of RAM. Tor’s default stretch distribution was installed
on each client. We deployed the broker at our home insti-
tution as a hidden service on Tor. The median ping latency
(without using Tor) from the client VMs to the broker was
133.9ms with a standard deviation (SD) of 61.9ms. With
Tor, the median ping latency increased to 715.9ms with a SD
of 181.8ms.
In our wide-area experiments we evenly distribute a vary-
ing number of clients across the 25 VMs and measure the
training error over time. Each client joins the system with a
bootstrapped sample of the original training set (n = 21,000
and sampled with replacement), and proceeds to participate
in asynchronous model training.
7.2 Model convergence
We evaluate the effect of the privacy parameter ε and the
batch size b when performing learning over TorMentor. Fig-
ure 5 shows training error over time with a single client per-
forming differentially private SGD [44] to train a logistic re-
gression model using the entire training shard.
We found that models converge faster and more reliably
when the batch size is higher and when ε is higher (less pri-
vacy). These results are expected as they are confirmations
of the utility-privacy tradeoff. In settings with a low ε (more
privacy) and a low batch size we observed that the effect of
differential privacy is so strong and the magnitude of the ad-
ditive noise is so large that the model itself does not con-
verge, rendering the output of the model useless. Based on
these results, the experiments in the remainder of the paper
use a batch size of 10.
7.3 Scalability and overhead
We also evaluated TorMentor’s scalability by varying the
number of participating clients. We evaluate the overhead
of Tor and the wide-area in TorMentor by running TorMen-
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Figure 6: TorMentor model convergence in deployments
with 10, 50, 100, and 200 clients.
# of Clients TorMentor w/o Tor
10 819 s 210 s
50 210 s 34 s
100 135 s 18 s
200 67 s 13 s
Table 2: Time to train the model with TorMentor, with and
without Tor, over a varying number of clients.
tor experiments with and without Tor. All nodes were hon-
est, held a subsample of the original dataset, and performed
asynchronous SGD.
Figure 6 shows that, when updating asynchronously, the
model convergences at a faster rate as we increase the num-
ber of clients.
We also compared the convergence time on TorMentor
with a baseline WAN parameter server. For the WAN pa-
rameter server we used the same clients deployment, but by-
passed Tor, thereby sacrificing anonymity.
The results in Table 2 show that on average, the overhead
incurred from using Tor ranges from 5-10x. However, as the
number of clients increases, the training time in both deploy-
ments drops, while the central deployment slows down.
7.4 Inversion defenses evaluation
We first set up the inversion attack by carefully partitioning
the dataset. Of the 30,000 examples in the credit dataset,
9,000 (30%) examples were partitioned into Xtest , a test
dataset. The remaining 21,000 examples were evenly par-
titioned across clients. The victim’s dataset Xv was one of
these partitions, with all the yi prediction values flipped. This
was done to sufficiently separate the victim model from the
globally trained model6. With this victim dataset, a globally
6We originally attempted the inversion with one of the training data
shards as the victim dataset, but we found that even naively comparing the
Figure 7: TorMentor without Tor model convergence in de-
ployments with 10, 50, 100, and 200 clients.
trained model achieved an error of 95.4% when attempting
to reconstruct the victim model, and predicting on the test
set.
With this setup we carried out the attack described in Fig-
ure 4. Each attack was executed for 4,000 gradient iterations,
which was long enough for the global model to reach con-
vergence in the baseline case. We then calculated the recon-
struction error by comparing the resulting inversion model
to the true victim model, a model trained with only the vic-
tim’s data, by comparing predictions on the test set. That
is, if the inversion model and true victim model classify all
test examples identically, the reconstruction error is 0. The
reconstruction error would also serve as the error when an
attacker uses outputs from Mˆv to infer the training examples
in Xv [47, 16].
Since the inversion attack is passively performed, it is de-
fended by a client carefully tuning the privacy parameters ε
and the minimum number of clients k. We evaluate the ef-
fects of these parameters in Figures 8 and 9.
Figure 8 shows the effect of the privacy parameter ε on the
reconstruction error, as ε is varied from 0.5 to 5, plotting the
median and standard deviation over 5 executions.
In the baseline case the client and curator are alternating
gradient updates as in Figure 4, and there is no differential
privacy. As ε decreases (increasing privacy), the reconstruc-
tion error of the inversion attack increases. When ε = 1, the
reconstruction error is consistently above 10%.
When the attacker sends a vector of zeros as their gradient
update, the inversion attack is most effective, as this com-
pletely isolates the updates on the global model to those per-
formed by the victim. Figure 8 shows the same experiment
performed when the attack contributes nothing to the global
model. As ε increases beyond 2 (decreasing privacy), the
final global model M∗g to the optimal victim model M∗v resulted in a low re-
construction error of 4.4%. Thus, separating the victim model in a way that
makes it distinguishable is necessary.
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Figure 8: Model agreement between victim model and in-
verted estimate in the ideal setting (Fig. 4), with varying ε .
attack performed without sending any gradients consistently
outperforms the attack when performing gradient updates.
This behavior, however, is suspicious and a well designed
validator would detect and blacklist such an attacker. There-
fore, this case is a worst case scenario as the attacker must
attempt to participate in the model training process.
Inversion attacks are made more difficult when random-
ness in the ordering of gradient updates is increases. Two
methods for increasing this randomness include (1) adding
random latencies at the broker, and (2) introducing by-
standers: clients other than the attacker and victim. In Fig-
ure 9, we evaluate both of these methods by asynchronously
training a model on TorMentor with one victim, one attacker
(using the same datasets as in Figure 8), and a varying num-
ber of bystanders. When replying to a client response, we
sample a random sleep duration uniformly from 0-500ms at
the server before returning a message. All clients choose the
same value for parameter k and the actual number of clients
in the system is equal to k. Thus, in the framework consist-
ing of one victim and one attacker, the number of bystanders
equals k−2.
Introducing even just one bystander (k = 3) into the sys-
tem increases the reconstruction error during an inversion at-
tack from about 20% to 40%. As k grows, a model inversion
attack becomes more difficult to mount.
Figure 9 also illustrates that differential privacy defends
client privacy when the number of bystanders is low. When
there are no bystanders in the system, decreasing the privacy
parameter ε (more private) increases the reconstruction error.
The effects of a low ε value in a model inversion setting have
a higher variance than in executions with higher ε values.
Another mechanism that helps to mitigate inversion attacks
is the adaptive proof of work mechanism that counters sybils
(an attacker could spawn k−1 sybils as an alternative way to
isolate the victim).
Figure 9: Reconstruction error between victim model and
inverted model estimate, with varying privacy parameters:
the number of bystanders and the privacy parameter ε .
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Figure 10: Model training loss over time, when attacked by
a varying proportion of poisoners. RONI threshold is main-
tained at 2%.
7.5 Poisoning defenses evaluation
We evaluate the effect of our proof of work on poisoning at-
tacks. To do this, we deployed TorMentor in an setting with-
out differential privacy or Tor in a total asynchronous setting
with 8 clients. We then varied the proportion of poisoners
and the RONI threshold. Figure 10 shows the training error
for the first 250 seconds for a RONI threshold of 2%, while
varying the proportion of poisoning attackers from 25% to
75%, with a validation rate of 0.1.
As the number of poisoners increases, different effects can
be observed. When the number of poisoners is low (below
25%), the model still converges, albeit at a slower rate than
normal. With 50% poisoning, the model begins to move
away from the optimum, but is successfully defended by the
validator, which increases the proof of work required for all
of the poisoners within 30 seconds. From this point, the poi-
soners struggle to outpace the honest nodes, and the model
continues on a path to convergence. Lastly, when the pro-
portion of poisoners is 75%, the increase in proof of work is
too slow to react; the model accuracy is greatly compromised
within 20 seconds and struggles to recover.
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Figure 11: Model training loss over time, when attacked by
50% poisoners. RONI threshold is varied from 0.5% to 5%.
From this evaluation, we note that, if a poisoner was able
to detect this defense, and attempt to leave and rejoin the
model, an optimal proof of work admission puzzle should
require enough time such that this strategy becomes infeasi-
ble.
Figure 11 shows the execution of model training with 50%
poisoning clients for different RONI validation thresholds.
As the threshold decreases, adversaries are removed from the
system more quickly, allowing the model to recover from the
poisoning damage.
Setting the RONI threshold too low is also dangerous as
it increases the effect of false positives. In Figure 11, we
observe that the model initially performs poorly, this is due
to incorrectly penalizing honest clients. The effect of a low
RONI is especially noticed in combination with differential
privacy. To confirm this, we performed two additional ex-
periments in which the validator had a RONI threshold of
0.5% (the highest threshold from Figure 11), and a full set
of honest clients with differential privacy parameter ε joined
the model. When ε was set to 5, the model converged to an
optimal point in 480 seconds. When ε was set to 1, the val-
idator flagged all of the honest clients, and the model did not
reach convergence.
The difference between model convergence, model diver-
gence, and a privacy violation all rely on a careful inter-
play between ε , the minimum number of clients k, the RONI
threshold, the proof of work difficulty, and the anticipated at-
tacks that TorMentor expects to deter. Determining the opti-
mal parameters for a deployment depends on the anticipated
workloads, data distribution, and attack severity. Given the
large scope of potential attacks and attack scenarios in this
space [24], we leave the exploration of such parameter se-
lection to future work.
8 Discussion
User incentives. Although TorMentor demonstrates
that privacy-preserving, untrusted collaborative ML is
technically feasible, social feasibility remains an open ques-
tion [45]. That is, are there application domains in which
data providers are incentivized to contribute to models from
anonymous curators? And do these incentives depend on
the type of data, protections offered by a brokered learning
setting, or something else? Regarding curators, are there
cases in which curators would be comfortable using a model
trained on data from anonymous users? We believe that such
application domains exist, partly because of the widespread
usage of federated learning [18] and a growing concern over
data privacy [14].
Usability of privacy parameters. Allowing clients and cu-
rators to define their own privacy parameters ε and k allows
for more expressive privacy policies, but these parameters,
and their implications, are difficult for users to understand.
Furthermore, privacy budgets, a fundamental element in
safely implementing and using differential privacy, are
complex and difficult to understand [14], as evidenced by
Apple’s recent struggles in implementing such a system [46].
Machine learning and Tor latency. Table 2 shows that Tor
adds significant latency to the machine learning process. On
the one hand this (unpredictable) latency can make it more
difficult to mount an attack; for example, the success of the
inversion attack partly depends on predictable timing. On the
other hand, it would be desirable to shorten training time.
At the moment Tor’s latency is paid at each iteration, indi-
cating that methods with a lower iteration complexity would
perform better. One solution to this problem is to locally
aggregate gradients [23, 31, 6] over many iterations before
sending them to the broker, trading off potential model stal-
eness for reduced communication costs.
Outside of aggregating gradients, several iterative alterna-
tives to SGD exist, such as the Newton-Raphson method [25]
or other quasi-Newton methods [20], which involve comput-
ing the second-order Hessian. This provides convergence
with a lower iteration complexity, but with a higher compu-
tational cost per iteration. A differentially-private version of
the Newton-Raphson method has also been developed [26].
TorMentor can be extended to generally support iterative
ML update methods. For models and learning objectives
where Newton-Raphson is applicable, we expect that
Newton-Raphson will complete faster than SGD when
accounting for the overhead of Tor.
Data-free gradient validation. While we demonstrated that
our active validation approach defends against attacks (e.g.,
Figure 10), it relies on the curator, who defines the learning
objective, to provide the ground truth to determine if an up-
date is beneficial or not. This approach is not only prone to
bias but also opens up a new avenue for attack from the cura-
tor; an adversarial curator could submit a junk validation set
to attack clients.
It is possible to mitigate these risks by using a data-free
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solution. An open question is whether or not it is possi-
ble to achieve the same effect without an explicit ground
truth. We believe that the use of a statistical outlier detection
method [22] to detect and remove anomalous gradient up-
dates may bring the best of both worlds. This would alleviate
the need for and risk of a curator-provided validation dataset,
and this technique would also eliminate the computational
overhead of performing explicit validation rounds. Another
alternative would require the use of robust ML methods that
are known to handle poisoning attacks [3, 34], but these
methods are only applicable with stronger assumptions about
the curator who now must specify a ground truth model.
9 Conclusion
We introduced a novel multi-party machine learning setting
called brokered learning, in which data providers and model
curators do not trust one another and inter-operate through a
third party brokering service. All parties define their privacy
requirements, and the broker orchestrates the distributed ma-
chine learning process while satisfying these requirements.
To demonstrate that this proposal is practical, we developed
TorMentor, a system for anonymous, privacy-preserving ML
in the brokered learning setting. TorMentor uses differen-
tially private model training methods to provide the strongest
known defenses against attacks in this setting [24] and to
support heterogeneous privacy levels for data owners. We
also developed and evaluated novel ML attacks and defenses
for the brokered learning setting.
Using a Tor hidden service as the broker to aggregate and
validate client gradient updates, TorMentor collaboratively
trains a model across 200 geo-distributed clients, without
ever directly accessing the raw data or de-anonymizing any
of the users. We define a realistic threat model for bro-
kered learning and show that in contrast to existing solutions
for distributed ML, such as Gaia [23] and federated learn-
ing [31], TorMentor’s defenses successfully counter recently
developed poisoning and inversion attacks on ML.
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Appendices
Appendix A: SGD and differential privacy
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD). In SGD at each itera-
tion t, the model parameters w are updated as follows:
wt+1 = wt −ηt(λwt + 1b ∑
(xi,yi)∈Bt
∇l(wt ,xi,yi)) (1)
where ηt represents a degrading learning rate, λ is a regular-
ization parameter that prevents over-fitting, Bt represents a
gradient batch of training data examples (xi,yi) of size b and
∇l represents the gradient of the loss function.
As the number of iterations increases, the effect of each
gradient step becomes smaller, indicating convergence to a
global minimum of the loss function. A typical heuristic
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involves running SGD for a fixed number of iterations or
halting when the magnitude of the gradient falls below a
threshold. When this occurs, model training is complete and
the parameters wt are returned as the optimal model w∗.
Distributed SGD. In parallelized ML training with a param-
eter server [28], the global model parameters wg are par-
titioned and stored on a parameter server. At each itera-
tion, client machines, which house horizontal partitions of
the data, pull the global model parameters wg,t , compute and
apply one or more iterations, and push their update ∆i,t back
to the parameter server:
∆i,t =−ηt(λwg,t + 1b ∑
(xi,yi)∈Bt
∇l(wg,t ,xi,yi)) (2)
wg,t+1 = wg,t +∑
i
∆i,t
Differential privacy and SGD. ε-differential privacy states
that: given a function f and two neighboring datasets D and
D′ which differ in only one example, the probability of the
output prediction changes by at most a multiplicative factor
of eε . Formally, a mechanism f : D→ R is ε-differentially
private for any subset of outputs S⊆ R if
Pr[ f (D) ∈ S]≤ eεPr[ f (D′) ∈ S].
In differentially private SGD [44] the SGD update is re-
defined to be the same as in Equation (2), except with the
addition of noise:
∆i,t =−ηt(λwg,t + ∑
(xi,yi)∈Bt
∇l(wg,t ,xi,yi)+Zt
b
) (3)
where Zt is a noise vector drawn independently from a dis-
tribution:
p(z) ∝ e(α/2)||z||
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